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Abstract: 
Many kinds of body/mind practices are capable of producing remarkable behaviors and altered 
body states.  A typology of such behaviors and states, defined as observable and intentional 
“extreme” alterations to the body, is presented.  Epistemological and methodological issues are 
discussed: limitations of observational data, and role of meaning, intentionality, and 
consciousness.  Rapprochement between Western medicine and Indo-Tibetan medicine requires 
rethinking biomedicine’s radical grounding in physicality and reliance on “evidence-based 
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medicine,” and guarding against an ethnocentric western intellectual hegemony motivating 
medical science and clinical practice to colonize and subvert non-western traditions like Indo-
Tibetan Buddhist medicine.  
 
 
Introduction 
The authors writing in this special issue address the possibility of a revolution occurring 
in Western medical science, in particular in the areas that study longevity, regeneration, and 
maintenance of optimal health.  The September 2006 conference’s goal was to find ways that 
Indo-Tibetan medicine and Western medicine could talk to each other, and promising areas of 
convergence were discovered.  Most of the scientists participating in the conference provided  
hypothesis-generating data from laboratory research suggesting that Indo-Tibetan medicine’s 
meditative and exercise practices may enhance the innate potential within all humans to achieve 
longevity and optimal health.  As a medical anthropologist specializing in chronic pain, my 
evidence is indirect, and takes the form of cross-cultural data on what I’m calling “extreme 
behaviors,” defined as observable and intentional “extreme” alterations to the body. 
Many kinds of body/mind disciplines are capable of producing remarkable “extreme 
behaviors”: examples include religious rituals requiring mortification of the body that cause less 
injury than would be expected, martial arts, and even athletic training that leads to new world 
records.  The cross-cultural record reveals abundant evidence of widespread practices that 
challenge what we consider to be the limits to “normal” human anatomy, physiology, and 
behavioral potential.  What follows is a typology of  “extreme behaviors” accompanied by 
examples chosen for their ability to illustrate certain epistemological and methodological issues 
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that complicate interpretation of this kind of data.  Delving into these issues helps us understand 
some of the barriers separating biomedicine (here used interchangeably with “Western 
medicine”) and vastly different medical traditions like Indo-Tibetan Buddist medicine.  Meaning 
and intentionality (and consciousness) play extremely important roles in producing “extreme 
behaviors,”  yet several foundational assumptions of biomedicine that restrict data-gathering 
techniques to observation limit our ability to comprehensively analyze and interpret these 
behaviors. 
I conclude with an appeal to be aware of and resist an ethnocentric Western intellectual 
hegemony that at times motivates medical science and clinical practice to colonize and subvert 
non-western traditions like Indo-Tibetan Buddhist medicine.  Rather, these traditions should be 
treated with the respect they deserve, which means making serious attempts to understand them 
(and understanding does not mean believing), thus ensuring that the conversation remains a truly 
two-way one. 
A Typology of “Extreme Behaviors” 
Most “extreme behaviors” involve powerful mind/body connections, and many of these 
traditions, but not all, involve expert practice, here glossed as “discipline,” which is the 
subcategory of most interest to us.  However, understanding other kinds of “extreme behaviors” 
is also helpful, by way of contrast. 
To be included in the typology below, a practice must be culturally prescribed—
understood and approved of by some kind of community.  Idiosyncratic “extreme behaviors,” 
engaged in for whatever reason, do not qualify.  Note that this typology does not include body-
altering practices performed on a child or on an unwilling person.   However, one subcategory 
does involve an individual engaging in practices that alter the body of another, an adult who 
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voluntarily submits to the procedures.  Also note that the typology is made up of Weberian 
(following sociologist Max Weber) “ideal types,” a heuristic that facilitates analysis through 
construction of a set of totally distinct types. Such types are termed “ideal” because they rarely 
appear in such discrete form in real life, where boundary blurring often occurs. 
The first category, that of ordeals, is illustrated by the Plains Indian Sun Dance. (1)  Into 
this category fall practices intended to breach the body’s integrity in some fashion, and do not 
involve prior disciplinary training.  In the case of the Sun Dance ceremony, whose meaning is 
religious, young men insert leather straps through incisions in their chests or backs and then are 
suspended from ropes in the center of the tent where the ritual is being held.  To show their 
ability to withstand pain, dancers should remain stoic no matter what they are experiencing.  
Such mortification rituals are encountered in many, many cultures and serve many purposes.  In 
some, like flagellants in certain Catholic religious processions, it is appropriate to show pain and 
suffering; in others the individual betrays weakness or lack of faith if any kind of pain behavior 
appears. 
 This initial category introduces the first epistemological consideration: behaviors that we 
observe do not necessarily tell us about inner states like pain. Rituals of the ordeal type require 
experiencing pain, but, again, we cannot know what the participant is actually feeling; in some 
cases it is possible the participant has lost consciousness and during that time experiences no 
pain.(2)  We can never be sure what an individual is experiencing, even if he or she talks about 
it, for reports of experiences are not the same as the experiences themselves.(3) Neither verbal 
reports nor nonverbal pain behavior provide irrefutable evidence; they are at best 
approximations, and at worst totally misleading. 
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The second category involves “extreme behavior” that does not seem to produce pain.  
Five photographs of Tibetan Bon shamanic adepts illustrate this category [Figures 1a-e].  An 
adept’s facial expression may be quite difficult to read with respect to either the actual 
experience or what, if any, non-verbal messages are being sent, particularly if the observer does 
not know much about the practice.  Figure 1b is a good case in point: this individual shows no 
embodied response to the breach of bodily integrity.  We simply do not know if pain is being 
experienced but not acknowledged, or is absent.  Brain scanning technologies would provide 
more information, but we still would not know what the individual is actually experiencing. 
The third category involves “extreme behaviors” that, rather than mortify the flesh, are 
feats that demonstrate remarkable control over the body. The photograph of Wim Hoff, 
practicing a variation of Tibetan tumo meditation, illustrates this category [Figure 2].  Adepts 
like Mr. Hoff show impressive mind/body discipline, but, again, we cannot ascertain an adept’s 
inner state.  Our observations merely tell us that though the photograph reveals extreme control –  
withstanding freezing temperatures for, at this event, approximately an hour and a half with no 
clothing or insulation – but with a fairly calm, although intent, facial expression.  Although it is 
difficult to imagine a neuroscanning technology employable in such situations, perhaps one will 
be available in the future; we still would not know what the person is thinking. 
Also included in Category Three is “extreme behavior” detectable only by measuring a 
physiological function (for example, a substantial reduction in heart rate,(4) if such a state is the 
result of discipline.  Category Three illustrates best the disciplined human body’s ability to 
withstand injurious actions that normally produce pathological consequences, and emerge with 
minimal or no deleterious effects—truly mind over matter. 
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The fourth category is trance, something well understood in Western medicine.  This type 
of “extreme behavior” differs from the ordeal type in that the person is supposed to lose 
consciousness.  Some trancing involves being possessed by another being.  Again, we do not 
know for sure what the individual’s inner state is (the Sun Dancer may have gone into trance as 
well—although not a culturally prescribed one); here, also, the facial expression often tells us 
very little. Although in the West most people under hypnosis remain aware of their surroundings 
and are in control of mind and body, (5) in some other situations the trance is deeper.  What 
trancers feel in the way of pain seems to vary from culture to culture, as does the degree of 
consciousness during the trance.  In quite a number of cases after the event the individual has no 
accessible memory of what occurred.  Scopolamine, used in the early 20th century for childbirth 
pain, which did not relieve the pain but obliterated the memory of it, would constitute something 
of a Western analogue to trancers who have no memory of their experiences. 
An example of trance without possession is illustrated by patients being treated in São 
Paulo, Brazil, by Dr. Mauricio Megalhães, a gynecologist who practices Western medicine, 
except every other Wednesday when he holds a free clinic and treats patients by summoning 
astral spirits.  In order to demonstrate that it is the spirits doing the healing rather than 
biomedical procedures, he performs grotesque parodies of surgery, and yet patients exhibit no 
pain behavior.  (Also remarkable are their subsequent reports of having been cured.)  This clinic 
has been studied by an anthropologist, Sidney Greenfield, who made a documentary film of 
some of these sessions.(6)  Greenfield and a visiting anthropologist-physician team (R.T. 
Anderson and S.T. Anderson) conclude that patients are in trance, but at no point is this 
possibility mentioned by either the physician or the patients. 
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There are many examples of trance or trance-like states: the beatific expression on the 
faces of saints being martyred in paintings may not be due to the artist’s wanting to depict them 
as holy but something that actually happened: religious ecstasy can be so powerful that the worst 
torture cannot interrupt the experience of bliss.  Some observers of Joan of Arc’s burning at the 
stake reported a very calm facial expression; the same can be seen in photographs and video 
footage of the Vietnamese Buddhist monks who self-immolated protesting the South Vietnamese 
regime in the mid-1960s.  Note, however, that we cannot categorically conclude that trance 
explains the behavior, which could also be due to stoicism. 
A mysterious case similar to the Sao Paulo clinic example comes from a rural clinic in 
Brazil where a patient, following a surgical procedure in which the healer, João de Abadiania, 
jabbed a surgical scissors into his spinal column, reported having experienced excrutiating pain 
during the procedure, but had exhibited no pain behavior at the time.(7) We cannot explain this 
anomaly; had he been in some degree of trance and could register pain only afterwards? Had he 
experienced excrutiating pain but been able to remain stoic in the face of such assault?  Or, rather 
improbably, had he not, in fact, been in trance but nevertheless did not experience pain, and 
afterwards misrepresented the experience? 
A ritual in Kataragama, Sri Lanka, illustrates possession by a supernatural being: a 
devotee has metal hooks inserted into his back, is raised by ropes, and swings suspended from a 
wooden beam.  At the beginning of the ritual he goes into trance and is declared a deity incarnate 
for the day.  In this state he confers blessings on the community.  The devotee shows no sign 
whatsoever of suffering, and reports experiencing a state of exaltation.(8)  Note that Western 
psychiatry considers this form of trance as pathological—“dissociation.” 
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The two Brazilian examples are healing events, the opposite of the intention behind 
ordeals like the Plains Indian Sun Dance.  This healing goal links Category Four with 
biomedicine.  In the West, if a medical procedure will injure the body or otherwise cause pain, 
anesthesia is used.  However, sometimes a patient will choose to withstand the pain of a dental 
procedure rather than be injected with an anesthetic; if a stoic attitude is successfully adopted, we 
come close to one interpretation of the rural Brazilian example.  
Discussion 
This typology of “extreme behaviors” reveals complexities that illustrate some aspects of 
the divide between biomedicine and radically different medical traditions like Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhist medicine.  It is true that certain clinical observational techniques will provide more 
information about some of the cases; for example, we can ascertain whether someone is in 
trance.  And scanning technologies provide additional information about the functioning brain 
and alterations in structure.  Even so, the ensemble of cases presented above illustrates the 
difficulty of drawing conclusions solely based on observation, because we have no access to the 
meaning of each kind of “extreme behavior,” in particular the intentionality behind it. And, 
despite scanning technologies we still can know very little about the actual experience.  We 
simply cannot understand these remarkable cases of intentional, culturally meaningful behavior 
if we are only permitted to observe, whether with the naked eye or with technologically 
sophisticated measuring instruments.  After all, such behavior has not appeared accidentally; the 
reason ordeals, feats, inexplicable absence of injury, etc., occur has to do with culturally 
mandated intentions and action, which—no matter how curious we may be about an individual’s 
ability to achieve amazing feats—are simply inexplicable within Western notions of proper 
motivation and proper behavior.  Such “extreme behaviors” are even more of an enigma within 
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biomedicine; as noted, psychiatry has labeled some of them instances of psychopathology.  In the 
case of possession it cannot do otherwise, for a foundational assumption of biomedicine premises 
a single self in a single body. 
Despite the vistas opened up by brain imaging technology, what is going on in the mind 
still must be inferred, which biomedicine, whose methodology demands observational data that 
can be verified, does not allow.(9) We can discover so little because knowing what such 
“extreme behaviors” mean to those who engage in them is more fundamental to understanding 
them than many other kinds of behavior.  If we want to investigate meaning and intentionality, 
we must analyze domains comprised of symbols, for example, language. However, such 
analytical methodology is incommensurable with the foundational assumptions underlying 
biomedical research, one of which is a radical grounding in physicality and materiality, in a 
western concept of nature that excludes culture—excludes symbols, the supernatural, and the 
teleological.  Nor can biomedicine’s paradigm include experience; as Arthur Kleinman puts it, 
“Experience is fugitive, fungible, and therefore invalid.”  Of course, applied biomedicine—
clinical practice—makes inferences and trafficks in symbols all the time, the symptom serving 
perhaps as the best example.  And biomedical practice employs all sorts of non-scientific 
procedures and attitudes—the interview, empathic listening, etc.—that allow us to make 
headway in understanding why people would want to treat their bodies in such an abnormal 
manner.  But we are not discussing actual clinicians, actual clinical practice, the art of medicine, 
etc., but the foundational assumptions of biomedicine, in particular what constitutes acceptable 
scientific methodologies.  Biomedical philosophy urges clinicians to go beyond the experiential 
evidence and replace it with observed, objective data, with signs rather than symptoms.  
Evidence-based medicine constitutes the gold standard of therapeutic practice.  As Kleinman 
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writes, the task of biomedical practitioners is to construct disease, a biological pathology, out of 
the evidence at their disposal, a set of signs and symptoms and other accompanying relevant 
information (for example, knowledge that the flu season has begun).  Disease here contrasts with 
illness, understood to be an experience—an instance, an illness episode as experienced by a 
specific individual who is ailing, or by others involved in his or her illness episode. 
Here is a paradox: an investigation of “extreme behaviors” promises an abundance of 
valuable information about mind-over-matter topics. But the key to understanding “extreme 
behaviors”—what in fact brings them into being (not in the sense of proximate causes, but more 
distal ones)—is not amenable to medical science methodologies, because what produces them 
depends on what they mean to the person—the whole person—exhibiting them.  We have here 
very abnormal body states which got that way not from pathological microbes, toxins, unhealthy 
behavior, etc., but due to an intentionality that holds great promise, if we can unlock the secrets 
relating to belief, will, and mental discipline that allow a body to engage in what are normally 
injurious practices and come away with little or no injury.  I would argue that the same is true 
with respect to various sought-after techniques of Tibetan Buddhist medicine, such as achieving 
high-level brain activation via high-frequency gamma waves and brain synchrony, or 
coordination.(10) 
We have returned to the question of how to translate the discourses and practices of the 
Indo-Tibetan Buddhist medical tradition (or any other similarly radically different tradition) to 
those of biomedicine. At present, no successful translation is possible.  Successful 
rapprochement between Western medicine and Indo-Tibetan medicine will require a radical 
revision of some of biomedical theory and methodology. 
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However, in fact many of the changes that would be required are already taking place.  
The alternative (integrative, complementary) medical knowledge discussed at the conference are 
part of a significant revolution in Western medicine in some respects already well along.  A 
remarkable number of clinicians incorporate various technologies and philosophies of these 
alternative medicinal traditions into their practice, and a remarkable number of complementary 
medicine programs have been established in health-delivery institutions, in part because a truly 
remarkable number of Americans have sought out complementary practitioners. 
These are some of the limits to biomedicine as a science, which obviously affect how it is 
practiced.  Serious body/mind perspectives subvert the biomedical paradigm, in that while we 
can see and measure brain function, we cannot see the mind, we cannot see experience.  What 
neurologist John Loeser says about pain applies to all experience: “Pain is not a thing; it is a 
concept that we impose upon a set of observations of ourselves and others.  It…cannot be 
measured directly.”(11) 
Conclusions 
The potential for fruitful exchange between the two knowledge systems being discussed 
in this special journal issue is impressive.  However, we also need to keep in mind the 
differences, at times vast, that separate them.  One difference is that Buddhism is a religion.  
Whatever the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist monks are thinking and feeling when they engage in the 
practices we are interested in, these thoughts and feelings cannot be incorporated into the secular 
Western scientific paradigm.  These knowledge systems describe and interpret a cosmos far 
different from the one Western science gounds itself on.  We need to respect these differences, 
and a good way to do this is to deeply understand them—always keeping in mind that 
understanding something is not the same thing as believing it. 
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Western knowledge, including science and medicine, is hegemonic, and at times assumes 
a rather imperialistic stance.  Of course, all medical systems establish truth claims that, to a 
greater or lesser degree, can be seen as ethnocentric, but biomedicine’s exclusion of other 
systems is much more extensive (and is easily defended, for these exacting requirements are 
generally considered to have led to biomedicine’s extremely impressive achievements).  At 
present, mind/body medicine’s acceptance by Western society depends on such rigorously 
acquired evidence; we shall see how the future unfolds in this area. 
Erin Olivo’s essay speaks about “a common language embraced by both traditions” that 
will “thereby truly achieve the ‘globalization of medicine,’” a wonderful goal.  But we must 
guard against what unfortunately all too often happens when an alternative healing system is 
appropriated by biomedical practice: the baby is thrown out with the bath water. 
 
Figure legends 
Figure 1.  Tibetan Bon Shamanic Ceremony.  In this annual event, intended to promote a balance 
between humanity and nature, as the ceremony heightens in intensity, young men of the village 
appear before the shaman one by one.  He pierces their cheeks, tongue, and back  (a) with foot 
long spikes and, showing no pain (b) the young men then dance to the beat of drums (c).  The 
shaman will also pierce the backs of men each with a dozen needles decorated with colored flags 
(d).  As these men dance in wild abandon (e), the back needles eventually fall out.  Note that 
there is no apparent bleeding from these piercings.  (Barbara J. Paul, photographer) 
 
Figure 2.  Wim Hoff, in a version of Tibetan tumo meditation, displays his ability to withstand 
extreme cold and, indeed, generate body heat.  He is shown here standing in ice (ambient 
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temperature was below freezing) for over one and one half hours in front of the Rubin Museum 
of Art in New York City.  His internal state cannot be determined from the focused, but 
otherwise unrevealing facial expression.  (Henry Boogert, photographer) 
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1. An illustration of a Blood Indian ceremony is found in. Viola 1990: 24-25. A photograph of a 
Cree initiation ceremony in Northwest Canada in 1886 is found in Anderson and Anderson 1994: 
p. 132. 
 
 2. Pain medicine has yet to agree on a single definition of pain.  The one used here defines pain 
as an experience, which requires consciousness,  Thus, even if nociception is present and brain 
activity normally indicative of pain is observed via scanning technologies, if the individual is not 
conscious, no pain is present.  Neurologist Antonio R. Damasio, on the other hand, distinguishes 
pain from knowing you have pain (1994: 262-267, and 1999: 71-76). Debates about the degree to 
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